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A Separation of Church and State
In Ontario Adoption Procedure
by GERALD STUART TUCK and ROBERT BURNSIDE BURGESS*
The Ontario Deputy Minister of Welfare has been quoted re-
cently as saying that "150 years of humane legislation has given On-
tario a Bill of Rights for children unsurpassed in any other jurisdic-
tion".1 He was referring to the Ontario Child Welfare Act,2 which
despite this praise still contains several anomalies which, it is sub-
mitted, render the operation of the adoption portion of the Act inef-
fective. The highly praised reforms made in the Act over the past six
years, while very progressive in the spheres of property law and status,
nevertheless have not, by themselves, been responsible for any increase
in the number of adoptions in Ontario-a major object, one would
assume, of any such legislation. The distressing fact remains that
many children, admirably suited for adoption, remain unplaced in
Ontario.
With this new positive legal protection for both adoptive parent
and adopted child created by the Act, why then are there so many
unplaced children in this province, especially in view of the fact that
there is a surplus of parents wishing to adopt a child? In Metropoli-
tan Toronto alone at the Metropolitan Children's Aid Society there
were 2230 children in the Society's care, of whom 1694 were perman-
ent wards and hence legally adoptible.3 Of these 1694 children, only
170 were under the age of four years, the age at which children cease
to be readily adoptible. Furthermore, the majority of these 170 child-
ren were in institutions for the emotionally disturbed, or mentally
or physically retarded. Others were already placed with adoptive
parents, but were waiting for the statutory six month probationary
period to elapse, so that their adoption would become final. It can be
seen from these figures that since less than ten per cent. of the child-
ren at the agency were under the age of four years no substantial
problem exists in the placement of infants at this agency.
There were 767 final adoption orders granted during 1960 as a
result of placements made by the Metropolitan Children's Aid Society.
*Messrs. Burgess and Tuck are in the Third Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 James S. Band, Deputy Minister of Welfare for Ontario as quoted in
the Toronto Globe and Mail, Sept. 7, 1957.
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 53.
3 These statistics were obtained from Miss Florence Schill, Public Re-
lations Director of the Metropolitan Toronto Agency in a personal inter-
view with her on January 20, 1961.
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When this figure is looked at in conjunction with the 170 children
under the age of four remaining, it can be seen that there is a rapid
rate of infant turnover at this agency. The remaining 1524 wards
who were over the age of four years were in care as a result of being
adjudged "neglected" under the provisions of section 17(9) of the
Child Welfare Act. Hence, many of these were over the age of four
when they came into care. Approximately twenty per cent. of all wards
come under the care of the Society in this way; however the feel-
ing that a child is best looked after in his own home, if possible, is
serving now to reduce this total.4 Also, prior to the inclusion in the
Act in 1954 of what is now section 17(15) a great many unwed
mothers took excessive advantage of the existing provision for temp-
orary committment. Prior to that time mothers would leave their
children in the temporary care of the Society for periods sometimes
extending to several years before consenting to allow the child to
become a permanent ward and hence adoptible. In such cases, the
children by the time they were legally adoptible were too old to be
wanted. At present with the provision that temporary wardship can-
not exceed a period of two years, the children that the Society has
for adoption are becoming younger when first they enter permanent
wardship. The backlog of children resulting from the misuse of the
pre-1954 provision has not yet reached the age of 18 years and there-
for many of them still remain in the care of the Metropolitan Child-
ren's Aid Society.
The number of older children at the Metropolitan agency should
be expected to decrease in the future,5 although the general problem
of placing and handling the over four year old is bound to remain
when one realizes that the demand for such children is negligible.6
Metro C.A.S. certainly at present does not have any appreciable
problem placing their infants-using that term to signify the under
four group.
The Catholic Children's Aid Society encounters the same diffi-
culty in placing older children, but there is a difference here, in the
fact that many of these older children first came into care as infants
but were not adopted. This can be seen from the fact that only 295
adoptions were completed during 1960 by the Catholic C.A.S. and 29
of these were placed with American parents. 7 There were, in Janu-
ary 1961, 1126 permanent wards there out of the 1480 children under
care. The rate of turnover at the Catholic agency was therefore, as
4It should be noted that both agencies have set up Protection Depart-
ments to visit these homes regularly to implement these policies.
5 The total of the Metropolitan C.A.S. is swelled by the fact that they
get the custody, usually, of those children of mixed racial background and
others difficult to place such as Negroes and Indians. The Catholic C.A.S.
gets relatively few of these children.6The attitude of our society seems to favour overwhelmingly the adop-
tion of infants. Unless a change in public opinion comes to pass, these older
children will always be hard to place.
7Al] the statistics pertaining to the Catholic C.A.S. were obtained from
Miss Zihlman of the agency's Public Relations office, during a personal inter-
view on January 11, 1961.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
computed on the basis of total adoptions completed against children
available for adoption only 23.4 per cent. per year. At the Metropoli-
tan agency the turnover rate was 45.3 per cent. Does this mean that
"adoptible" children at the Catholic C.A.S. are not getting the same
chance for adoption as similar children at the Metro C.A.S.? Al-
though no exact figures as to the number of Catholic C.A.S. wards in
the under-four category are available, Catholic C.A.S. officials indi-
cate that a great number of 1126 permanent wards were under the
age of four years. It seems to be a proper inference that a consider-
able number of "adoptible" wards of the Catholic C.A.S. are not being
adopted. As indicative of the existence of such a problem a Catholic
agency official indicated that although their present compaign for
foster homes8 had met with some success, they were still forced to
contravene section 31 of the Child Welfare Act with regard to the
placement of Catholic infants in the care of Protestant foster parents
temporarily.9 No other admission could more strikingly demonstrate
the imbalance between Catholic C.A.S. wards available for adoption
and Roman Catholic parents wishing to adopt.
On the other hand Miss Schill of the Metropolitan C.A.S. said
the most conservative figure she could give was a ratio of three pros-
pective Protestant parents whose applications were approved for
every infant that became available for adoption. In a recent article
on the subject, dealing with adoption in Canada as a whole, it was
said, "Catholic agencies have four children for every home they can
find. This means that while Catholic children go begging each year,
eight hundred Protestant or Jewish couples are turned down, another
two thousand give up and withdraw applications, and thousands
more wait in line". 0 The article emphasized these figures by referring
to the plight of a Catholic nun who understandably wished to remain
anonymous, but felt that it was unfortunate that religion could not
be suspended for a little while until all the children were placed."
In the light of the above figures it would seem fair to suggest
that under present Ontario law many adoptible Ontario wards are
being denied an opportunity to be adopted. What happens to these
infants? Those not suffering from defects requiring institutional care
are placed in foster homes under a system of temporary parenthood.12
From numerous interviews with social workers the impression was
81960 was proclaimed by James Cardinal McGuigan to be Catholic
Adoption Year in Toronto.
9 The practice of placing Roman Catholic Children in Protestant fosterhomes is known by the Metropolitan C.A.S. to exist, yet this practice is ap-
parently condoned in the interests of child welfare.
-
0 Is Our System of Child Adoption Good Enough? Robert Walker In
MacLeans, Sept. 26, 1959, p. 15.
31 bid. It is also pointed out that in 1958 there were some 25,000 wards
in the care of Children's Aid Societies and similar organizations throughout
Canada: hardly an encouraging figure.
22 Contrary to public belief most foster parents do not adopt the child-
ren dn their care. They are told by agencies that their custody will only be
temporary. They are permitted by section 32(3) of the Child Welfare Act
to adopt children in their care if the court feels it is in the best interests of
the child.
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conveyed to the writers that the foster parent plan is not nearly as
desirable, nor as beneficial to the welfare of the child, as being
adopted and acquiring permanent parents of its own. While no figure
was made available on the average number of different foster homes
in which each unadopted child was placed, it is not, it seems, unusual
for a child to have lived in upwards of ten foster homes during its
wardship. While undoubtedly the majority of these foster parents
hold the welfare of the child in high regard, it is also true that many
of these foster parents would not pass the stringent screening and
matching processes required of adopted parents by either agency.
Indeed, at the Catholic Children's Aid Society it was suggested that
many foster parents are primarily motivated by the financial ad-
vantages of foster parenthood.'3
The denial of the opportunity of adoption to many such infants
and the treatment subsequently accorded them would seem to refute
Welfare Minister Cecile's statement that, "It appears the legislation
has stood the test of time remarkably well; we shall continue to act
with the welfare of the child as our primary objective".14
It is suggested by the authors that the instrumentality of reli-
gion and its pressures is the main reason for the inbalance in the
number of prospective parents that wish to adopt infants and the
number of infants adopted each year. Is this based on policy or law?
In Ontario, the Child WeZfare Act never deals expressly with the
requirements of consistency in the religions of the adopted child and
the adopting parents. It does, however, in sections 31(1) and 31(2)
under Part II of the Act which is headed "Protection and Care of
Neglected Children" contain deeming sections imputing a religious
faith to the child. These sections are as follows:
31(1) A child shall be deemed to have the same religious faith as his
father unless it is shown that an agreement has been entered into
in writing, signed by his parents, that he be brought up in the
same religious faith as his mother.
(2) An illegitimate child shall be deemed to have the religious faith
of his mother.1 5
Provisions such as the above are customary in most North
American jurisdictions to ascertain a legal religion for each infant;
this ascertained, statutes may then go on to prohibit adoption out-
side this legal religion. Ontario has gone beyond the traditional "deem-
ing" provision of section 31(1) and (2) by further enacting that:
31(3) A Protestant child shall not be committed under this Part to the
care of a Roman Catholic Children's Aid Society or institution, and
a Roman Catholic child shall not be committed under this Part to
a Protestant Children's Aid Society or institution, and a Protestant
child shall not be placed in the foster care of a Roman Catholic
13Miss Zihlman of the Catholic Agency expressed this opinion during
the interview January 11, 1961.l 4 Welfare Minister Louis Cecile as quoted in the Toronto Globe and
Mail, Sept. 7, 1957.
15 R.S.O. 1960, c. 53.
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family and a Roman Catholic child shall not be placed in the foster
care of a Protestant family, and where a child committed under
this Part is other than Protestant or Roman Catholic, he shall be
placed where practicable with a family of his own religious faith.
(4) Subsection 3 does not apply to a child detained in a place of safety
dn a municipality in which there is only one children's aid society.
(5) Notwithstanding anything in this section the judge may have re-
gard to the wishes of the child in determining what order ought
to be made as to religious faith.16
No regulations are found in the Consolidated Regulations of Ontario
to assist in the interpretation or application of these subsections.
Clearly the above subsections only regulate expressly (a) the plac-
ing of children under the care of a Children's Aid Society and (b) the
placing of children within a foster home of his own faith. Even these
subsections apparently should apply only in those municipalities where
there is more than one Children's Aid Societyl 6A At any rate it is
quite clear that religion is not expressly mentioned in connection with
adoption as such, although it is quite possible that the legislature in-
tended religion to play an important part in adoptions. The wording
of the statute is so nebulous that the intention is not all discernible.
There is no other statute law controlling the religious factor in
adoption, nor is there any case law relevant to an interpretation of
these subsections. The common law historically did not recognize the
practice of adoption so that there is no doctrinal position with respect
to the question of religion and the adopted child. It should be pointed
out, however, that despite this apparent lack of legal sanction, pres-
ent adoption practice would indicate that this section is given a lay
interpretation forbidding adoption across religious lines. Would our
courts sustain this lay interpretation?
Manitoba has a similar section in their Child Welfare Act.-7 The
1959 Manitoba case of Re Blunderfield and Jamieson's provides an
insight into how the courts of Ontario might interpret section 31 of the
Ontario Child Welfare Act. In that case an unmarried Roman Catholic
mother consented to have her child adopted by the infant's grand-
parents who were of the Protestant faith. The infant had been duly
baptized as a Roman Catholic but was, however, placed privately in the
home of the grandparents. After a few months had elapsed, the
mother sought to have her consent vitiated and have the child re-
turned to her on the ground that she never had the capacity to
consent to an adoption across religious lines. The Manitoba Court of
Appeal was forced to place an interpretation on section 131 (a) of the
Manitoba Child Welfare Act, which like the Ontario section 31 does
not expressly mention "adoption", but deals exclusively with "placing
in the care of", a phrase customarily used only for placement in
foster homes. It reads as follows:
16 Ibid.
16A In all communities except the four with separate facilities, as en-
visaged by the Act, it has been the practise to have one C.C.A.S. official
associated within each C.A.S.17 R.S.M. 1954, c- 35.
18 (1959), 27 W.W.R. 1; 17 D.L.R. (2d) 583.
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131 "No child being dealt with under this act. (a) Being a Roman
Catholic child shall be placed in the care of a Protestant society,
or in a Protestant family, home or institution."
Williams, C.J.Q.B. delivering the judgment said,19 "The child is a
Roman Catholic child; it is such by the preference of the mother
shown when she had it baptized. There is nothing in the act giving
her the power to alter her preference.20 It is made once and for all
and the mother lost the power to consent to the child being placed in
a Protestant family". The mother was duly awarded custody of her
child by the court. Since this case dealt with an adoption, the ratio
would seem to be that a mother is powerless to consent to an adoption
across religious lines.21 If the Ontario statute were interpreted the
same way, certainly no adoption made by an agency would be al-
lowed to contravene Roman Catholic-Protestant boundaries. At the
present time in Ontario private adoptions are being made so that re-
ligious lines are crossed and it may be that section 31 does not pro-
hibit this practice when the adoption is arranged privately. This,
at best, indicates great inconsistency.
Even if section 31 in Ontario would not be as narrowly inter-
preted by a court as its counterpart in Manitoba, its very existence
exerts, in our opinion, a profound influence on adoption practice. Let
us scrutinize it from a legal standpoint. Subsection 3 of section 31
deals expressly with Roman Catholics, Protestants and "those other
than Protestants or Roman Catholics". It would seem from the sec-
tion that this latter somewhat nebulous category does not deserve
the "protection" granted the two larger groups-for they are only
to be placed with their own religious faith where it is practicable.
Practicable to whom, the society or the child? What could the cri-
teria for the practicability be when the two larger groups are pro-
tected in so mandatory a fashion? The statute by its narrowness in
referring only to two religions does not afford equal protection to all
religions-if such protection is to be desired.
For example, into what category would a Greek Catholic child
fall? It certainly would not be included in any accepted definition of
Protestant, and yet it is not a Roman Catholic. Is it to be consigned
to that third group of "others" and be adopted by a family that is
not Greek Catholic? The same reasoning could apply to Mennonites,
Jews, Moslems, Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses and all
such other religious groups which are clearly not Roman Catholic
and probably not Protestant, in accepted terms. The statute, it ap-
pears, was drafted without equal regard for minority religious be-
liefs.
19 Ibid. p. 591.
20 Is this decision to be taken to mean that under no circumstances could
a mother change the religion of her child? That is, if she were Protestant at
the time of the child's birth, but after the birth of her child she was con-
verted to Catholicism would she be denied a right to raise her child in the
Catholic faith?
21 Quaere: Since no final adoption order to our knowledge has ever been
upset in Canada, what would have happened in this case if the final adoption
order had been granted before the mother commenced litigation?
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In the light of the general intentions of the statute (with which
the authors do not necessarily concur) what is to become of an illegiti-
mate child born of a mother who is agnostic, that is, does not ascribe
to any religious faith? Subsection 2 of section 31 deems that a child
shall have the religious faith of his mother. If he thus be deemed
agnostic he could not, following subsection 3 of section 31, be legally
placed in any foster home for there are not any families of his
"religious faith" since he does not have a religious faith. Must such a
mother be forced to claim falsely a religious affiliation in order to have
some hope her child will be adopted?
The most striking criticism of all results from the impact of
subsection 4 of section 31. Strictly interpreted, this section removes
the "protection" afforded the child's religion by subsection 3, except
for those children in cities where more than one Children's Aid
Society exists. If this type of protection is so beneficial to children
in the larger cities where there are two Children's Aid Societies, why
should a reading of the Act deny it to all other children in the
province?
However, it is not intended to suggest changes in the pres-
ent structure to insure the minority religious groups equal protec-
tion of their religious interest. Nor should the Act be revised so that
a legal protection be given to religion where it confronts adoption
practice, rather than the protection which seems to be based largely
on practice as at present. On the contrary, in the best interests of
child welfare it would be far better to abandon the religious concept
in adoption practice completely.
Part I.
On what is this power of religion over adoption based? It is
based primarily, where the parents are married, upon the imputation
of the religious faith of the father to the child. Similarly, where the
parents are unmarried, the religious faith of the mother is imputed to
the child.2 2 What is the reason for this imputation? "Is it only the
age-old prejudice in favour of natural ties, in contrast to ties brought
into being by covenant, strengthened now by the statutory and ju-
dicial notice taken of the "religion of the child; when the latter in
turn is attributed to the child not only because of the statutes but
also because of the lingering force of common law notions of blood-
sonship as the only true form of sonship?"' 3
It would seem hardly rational that, the state having arbitrarily
chosen the parent from whom the religion of the child is to flow, does
not further legislate so as to make the parent care for the child
materially. Instead, the parent in the great majority of cases may
permanently leave the unwanted infant with the "proper" Children's
Aid Society twenty-eight days after birth, this consent to so leave
22 Religious imputation section: R.S.O. 1960, c. 53, sec. 31(1) and (2).2 3 Ramsay, (1959), 34 N.Y.U. Law Review, 649 at page 690.
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him having cut all legal ties with the child. All legal ties may be cut,
but this legal imputation of parental religion taken at birth from his
unwanting parent, may operate thereafter to preclude adoption for
the child, thus menacing the child's welfare and burdening the state
with the cost of his care until adulthood is reached. The wisdom of
the state in allowing these legal "imputation of religion" statutes to
exist should be seriously questioned.24
Irrespective of this mixing by the state with religion, and, irres-
pective also of the inconsistency of the state in dealing with the child's
religion at the expense of his welfare, any statute containing religious
imputation sections, such as those in the Ontario Child Welfare Act
section 31(1) and (2) raises fantastic interpretational problems for
the judiciary. Ontario has been singularly fortunate that such prob-
lems seem to have been settled without recourse to the courts. Otherjurisdictions have not been so fortunate.
For example, the Court of Appeals of New York, in order to
impute a religious faith to an unbaptized child, had to decide whether
"the religious faith" of the mother was her religious persuasion at
the time the child was born or whether it was her "birthright" re-
ligion as judged by past indicia. At the time the child was born the
mother had signed a document stating, "I have no religious faith at
the present"'. In this instance the court decided to apply the religion
-that is, no religion-supposedy held by the mother at the child's
birth although they felt that the document might have been signed
under duress.25
A second adjudicative problem may arise due to the omission from
sections of this nature of any provision for a person who either
doubts all religious faith or claims forthrightly that religion does
not exist. Thus, what would a court decide if an agnostic or atheistic
mother of an illegitimate child abandoned her child in the streets?
No person of any religious persuasion would be pleased if the law, in
its interference with religion under section 31(1) and (2) of the Child
Welfare Act forced the courts to rule that the child was deemed to
have the faith of his mother, that is, none at all. What could be the
court's ruling if this atheistic mother goes to court to block her
241t is necessary, in order to attribute the relevance to Ontario law of
many of the passages and cases quoted herein, drawn from other jurisdictions,
to explain that the dependence of adoption upon religion exists generally
throughout Canada and the United States.25 Matter of Maxwell, 4 N.Y. 2nd 429; 151 N.E. 2nd 848 (1958).
Here the majority judgment upheld the validity of the document, wiselydeciding they could not rule upon its bona fides without becoming involved in
a question of "quantum" of faith. Thus such a declaration of non-religion, atleast in New York gives a document the power to break the generation after
generation chain imputing the same religion to all members of a family.
However it must be noted that the strength of the judgment is impaired by
the realization of the majority judges that the adopting parents had consented
to raise the child in the religion of his natural mother. The dissenting judges
argued for the mandatory passage of the "birthright" religion, hardly a
liberal view.
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child's adoption to any but atheistic adoptive parents? A Supreme
Court of Canada precedent would seem to favour the mother.
26
Furthermore in placing judges in the untenable position of de-
ciding such a potentially-biased and personal matter as a person's
religious faith, we are putting an unnecessary burden on his con-
science. Apart from this embarrassment, can we reasonably expect
a judge, with the multiplicity of religious beliefs adhered to in our
society, to know what constitutes "religious faith", or to know what
constitutes each particular religion?27 Nor is a mere fund of knowl-
edge of religion and its dogma sufficient. For the judge under laws
such as these is constantly forced to evaluate and measure quantums
of faith, and also to surmount the inevitable confusion of "fides" and
"bona fides". 28 In conclusion it has been said that: "It seems entirely
proper for the civil courts who have no competence to judge what is
sacreligious not to presume to judge what is sacred or to determine
whether a person is religious or irreligious when there are so many
conflicting views on the subjects".29
In the light of these serious judicial problems, what is the argu-
ment used to justify the inclusion of sections like section 31 of the
Ontario Act in adoption legislation? According to Mr. Eric T. Smit,
Executive Director of the Family and Child Welfare Division of the
Dominion Government, the argument for inclusion is based on the
premise "that the religion of the child is a natural right derived from
26 In the following cases the true welfare of the child seems secondary
to the rights given in the Child Welfare Act to the natural mother. See Re
Baby Duffell, [1950] S.C.R. 737; 4 D.L.R. 1; affirming the Ontario Court of
Appeal in [1960] O.R. 35; 1 D.L.R. 694, and Hepton v. Maat, [1957] S.C.A. 606(1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 1 affirming the Ontario Court of Appeal in [1957] O.R.
64; (1957), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 488.
And see also Re Agar, MoNeilly et al. v. Agar, [1958] S.C.R. 52; (1958),
11 D.L.R. (2d) 721 affirming the Court of Appeal of Ontario in [1957] O.R.
359: (1957), 8 D.L.R. (2d) 353 which had reversed the trial judgment in [1957]
O.W.N. 49; (1957), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 502.
In the Re Agar case at p. 52 Locke J. in the Supreme Court of Canada
said, "I have examined with care the evidence in this case, and while of the
opinion that the child would be more likely to have a successful and happy
life if left in the custody of the appellants, I have come, with regret, to the
conclusion, that, in applying the rule as stated in the decisions of this court
in the cases of Duffell and Hepton, it has not been shown that the mother
should be refused custody".
27The courts have always refused to go into such problems because of
the inherent difficulties. For example bequests have been held void for uncer-
tainty if the gift was only to take effect if the beneficiary married a person
"not practising the Jewish religion". Vaisey J. in Re Krawitz's Will Trusts,
[1959] 3 All E.R. 793 at 796; 1 W.L.R. 1192 at 1195 stated: "I do not know,
except in the broadest and most indefinite sense, what is meant by 'practising'
the Jewish religion, or, indeed, any religion." (Italics mine.)
28 In the Matter of Glavis, 121 N.Y.S. 2nd 12 (1953). In this case the
court became entangled between the good faith of the father in excercising
his parental rights and the faith of the father used in the imputation of a
finding of the proper faith of the child. Here the Catholic father, who had
heretofore evidenced no interest in the Catholic faith had his children baptized
Roman Catholic while his wife was confined to hospital. His wife was Jewish
and the children had been circumcised four years earlier. Are the judges to
be faulted for their apparent confusion, or is the imposition of religion into
law responsible?29 S upra, footnote 23 at page 659.
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the parent and neither man nor his laws should interfere with this
right".30 In support of such a view is the famous statement of Judge
Considine of the Massachusetts court claiming that, "No one, not
even the parents, have the right to deny an immature child who has
been baptized a Roman Catholic the privileges of being reared in
Catholicity".31 Admittedly this is an extreme view and even goes
so far as to derogate from all natural parents the exercise of their
parental right qua supervision of family religious upbringing.
As long ago as 1886, the American jurist Jeremiah Black pointed
out that "the manifest object of the men who framed the institutions
of this country was to have a state without religion and a church
without politics-that is to say, they meant that one should never be
used as an engine for the purpose of the other."32 Although Canada
has no similar constitutional problem, both our new Bill of Rights3
and the unwritten legacy from our ancestors, emphatically declare
freedom of religion to exist in Canada. Canada has no state church.
Pre-eminence of freedom of religion absolutely precludes any attempt
to examine the statements of Mr. Smit or Judge Considine in order
to verify their theological correctness-in the light of the teachings
of the respective faiths. Under our constitutional system, one church
cannot force its interpretations upon all the other churches, or upon
the state. It is startling to suggest that the laws of Canada or On-
tario should enforce positivistic religious beliefs and interpretation
in what are essentially secular spheres.
It is misleading to present this problem in terms of the Roman
Catholic Church obtaining by means of statute law a device whereby
it can assert its religious tenets to the apparent detriment of adopt-
ible infants. This type of statute works both ways equally. However,
due to the fact that in Ontario there is a surplus of "adoptible"
Catholic wards, its practical effect is rather one sided. It is certainly
not the universal opinion of Catholic officials that statutes of this
sort are a proper exercise of legislative power in the context of a
democratic system of government. Father Joseph M. Snee, himself
both a priest and a lawyer and a member of the faculty of Law at
Georgetown University, has remarked, when speaking of a child bap-
tized as a Roman Catholic, "Does he have a right to be raised as a
Catholic? As a matter of Divine Law I would say yes. As a matter
of constitutional law I would say no, because the constitution speaking
3 0 Correspondence from E. T. Smit to Mr. Mervin Burgard, editor-in-chief
of Osgoode Hall Law Journal.
3 Quoted in Pfeffer, Creeds in Competition p. 131 (1958).3 2 Black, Jeremiah S., Essays and Speeches (1886) at p. 53.
33 Quaere: does freedom of religion also reflect acknowledgement of its
necessary corrolary, that is, the freedom not to be religious? It is suggested
that this is so. Why then does present Ontario adoption policy exclude aperson from enjoying the freedom of not being religious, from consideration
as a potential adoptive parent? This type of policy is analagous to having
all professors sign religious affiliation orders prior to consideration for
employment. For they also exert influence on the minds of youth!
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of freedom of religion, is speaking of religion from the subjective
viewpoint-the right of a person to choose his own religion".3 4
The legislature has not been so tender of religious views in all
areas where they conflict with the general welfare. For example,
consider the area of divorce law. The Roman Catholic Church will
not sanction divorce for its adherents, holding as a fundamental
tenet that holy matrimony once consummated is indissoluble. Most
other faiths approve of divorce in varying degrees. However, a mem-
ber of any religious group is still eligible under the law of Canada
to seek secular dissolution from his wife. Our courts, if satisfied that
the conditions precedent to the need for dissolution exist, will legally
break the bonds of holy matrimony. This action of the state does not
intrude upon the domain of the churches, nor are the churches forced
to give tacit approval of this dissolution. In the eyes of the State they
are separated; in the eyes, for example of the Roman Catholic
Church, they are not. The sanction that this Church imposes in such
cases is censure by means of excommunication, although it recognizes
that its sanctions under Divine Law may not transgress the boundaries
of the separation of Church and State. Every churchman then owes
an allegiance to two laws, to his Church and to his State; these laws
need bear no necessary similarity. The Parliament of Canada in
pursuance of its responsibilities has seen fit to allow divorce, as an
instrument by which people may seek marital compatibility a second
time-despite the contrary views of many of the religious groups in
Canada. But this is not the sole instance of a conflict in the laws of
state and church; perhaps a more striking example will elucidate.
The members of the sect of Jehovah's Witnesses are extremely
cognizant of the biblical admonition concerning "the eating of
blood". In modern times their leaders have interpreted this to include
an implicit prohibition of blood transfusions. But the state, through
its courts, again on a basis of public welfare, has employed the
wardship provisions of the Ontario Child Welfare Act to ensure that
all young children in Ontario have equal opportunities to receive
necessary transfusions of blood. This decision has not been extended
by the state to include those of full legal age and rightly so; how-
ever the state did feel that public policy decreed protection for those
not yet capable of forming their own religious beliefs.w
It is suggested that such a benevolent attitude should also be
assumed by the provincial legislature to protect those infants whose
possibilities of adoption are unnecessarily limited. It would seem
inconsistent, in the face of the Welfare Minister's avowed intention
to protect the welfare of the child,36 for the legislature not to intrude
itself to protect an infant child from the consequences of his natural
34 R eligion in Adoption and Custody Cases (1957 Conference at Vdllanova
School of Law) 71.
351t should be noted, however, that the present means of implementing
the decision may not be legal. See Religion, Medicine and the Law, by W. G.
How, 1960, Can. Bar Journal 365.
(VOL. 2:216226
1961] Separation of Church and State in Ont. Adoption Procedure 227
parent's religion, whether this religion deprives him of his chances
to be adopted-or to receive a blood transfusion.
Similarly, the churches affected, drawing an analogy from the
statements of Father Snee,36 should be able to effect a reconciliation
of the state's decision, if made, to permit what would at present be
called "adoptions across religious lines". The position of the various
religious groups on this matter should be analogous to that taken after
the Legislature enacted divorce legislation. The state would not be
impinging upon the Churches right to baptize an infant child of
Catholic parents as their Divine law dictates is necessary. So long as
the mother retains custody and guardianship of the child, she alone
should have the right to direct and control its religious education,
uncontrolled by the state. At the instant when she agrees to surrender
the child to the state, that is, to the Children's Aid Society, any con-
trol based upon her own religious affiliation should be severed. The
state should then be allowed to place the child wherever it deems
fit having always the child's welfare as its principal consideration.
It is necessary that the state respect conscientious religious
beliefs where it does exist in a child. That is, if a child were of an age
where it could comprehend, if only in a very basic way, the religious
teachings of his faith then adoption "across religious lines" would
definitely not be recommended. One relatively easily administered
solution to this aspect of the fallacy of religious imputation 7 would
be a policy based upon differentiating between those children who
had received the benefit of a ceremony of religious indoctrination
such as baptism, circumcision etc. and those had had not. However,
a differentiation based on the indicia of a religious ceremony would
favour those religions where ceremonies such as baptism are required
at an extremely early age; as the legislature should not so favour one
group. Moreover, it is absolutely certain that a child could not
knowledgeably uphold any persuasion a few days after birth. Con-
sequently, it is submitted that the "break-off age" would have to be,
as set out above, determined by the presence or absence of con-
scientious religious belief.
Although the welfare of the child is the principal motivation in
suggesting reform, an intelligent appraisal of the effect of the policy
inherent in section 31 of the Act, shows the heavy financial responsi-
bility in the continuance of such policy if the result is that a large
group of "adoptible" infants are not being adopted. Foster parents
in Metropolitan Toronto are paid a minimum of forty dollars per
3 6
op. cit. Globe and Mail, Sept. 7, 1957.
37 That this practice of imputation is a fallacy is borne out by St. ThomasAquinas. In Summa Theologicae III Sup., Q. 54 art. 4, Aquinas at page 65
states "it was only in former, pre-Christian times that the Divine worship washanded down as the inheritance of the race and that now 'the worship of God
is no longer handed down by carnal birth but by spiritual grace' ".
38 There is a great discrepancy in the ages at which various religious
groups permit these ceremonies. For example the Roman Catholic Church
recommends baptism as soon as possible while Baptists suggest a waiting
period of twelve to fourteen years.
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month and in addition the Society pays the cost of the clothing, school-
ing, medical and dental care. The total cost of care per child per year
averages out to roughly seven hundred and fifty dollars a year. Last
year in Metropolitan Toronto alone the total cost of foster child
care, in approximate figures, was slightly more than two million
dollars; this cost does 'not even include the cost of care administered
to children of either agency maintained in institutions. Where then
does the money come from to finance these foster homes?
In 195939 the Catholic Children's Aid Society received all but
$6,878 out of a total budget of $1,769,751 from the Municipality of
Metropolitan Toronto, the Province of Ontario and the United Ap-
peal40, none of which are religious organizations. The Metropolitan
Children's Aid Society received its finances in much the same set of
proportion, only $36,988 of its total budget of $3,303,000 in 1959
from private sources. Consequently, it is apparent that various gov-
ernmental agencies together with the United Appeal, all purely secu-
lar in nature, sustained over 99 per cent. of the cost of the two
Children's Aid Societies.41
On an individual basis a child that came under the care of a
Children's Aid Society at the age of one month and remained in care
until he reached the age of eighteen would cost the public $13,500.
Projections of these figures point out the desirability from a financial
point of view to every Canadian tax payer of increasing the numbers
of adoptions each year. It is obvious that millions of dollars could be
saved by implementation of legal adoption across religious lines over
a period of years.
Having attempted to demonstrate the problem and its cause, a
possible legislative solution is set out below. This solution could be
brought about by amending the present section 31 of the Ontario
Child Welfare Act. Section 31 (amended) would then read:
A(1) A child, being under the age of four years, whether legitimate
or not, shall be deemed for purposes of all proceedings under
this Act to have no religious affiliation whatsoever.
(2) A child, being under the age of four years, whether legitimate
or not, shall be placed by the Children's Aid Society, with regard
to the best interests of the child and without consideration of the
particular religious faith of either the natural or adoptive parents
of the child. This shall apply to placement in a foster home or to
a placement for adoption.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) shall apply notwithstanding any form of
religious initiation or ceremony performed on or in the presence
of the child.
39See the 1959 Annual Reports for both the Catholic Children's AidSociety and the Metropolitan Children's Aid Society.
40 It is interesting to note that the total United Appeal Contribution to the
two agencies was $436,748 in 1959, but that the Catholic agency seemed to
receive a disproportionately small share of $103,210 in the light of the relative
number of children at each agency.41 It would seem most evident that various religious groups which in total
do not contribute more than one per cent. toward the welfare of these chil-
dren cannot justify religious control on the basis of their contributions.
[VOL. 2:216228
1961] Separation of Church and State in Ont. Adoption Procedure 229
B (1) A child, not being under the age of four, whether legitimate or
not, may not be placed, without consideration by the court of any
religious or spiritual belief 42 shown to the satisfaction of the
court to exist in the child.
(2) If the religious or spiritual belief is shown to the satisfaction of
the court to exist, the child shall be placed where practicable43
with a family holding that religious or spiritual belief.
In explanation, the age of four years as the line of demarcation
was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, social attitudes at present have
not progressed sufficiently to create a sizable demand for children
who have already reached this age. Secondly, since children in On-
tario begin elementary school at the age of five,44 it is our feeling
that, due to the existence of a separate school system, it is likely
that a child having entered school will have some religious persuasion
since by this time he is actually knowledgeable.
The amended 31 (B) is an attempt to draft a section permitting
the judiciary to approve adoptions "across religious lines" where it
is felt that the child, although over four, still is unaffected by his
religious environment. However the judge shall have no discretion
where a finding of an affirmative nature is made--except where it is
not at all probable that such a child would otherwise be adopted by
a family of his own religious faith.
No attempt to draft a penalty or license provision for sections
31(A) and (B) as amended was made due to inherent faith in the
integrity of agency employees. However such a regretable enactment
might be required if the provisions of this revision were not being
adhered to.4 5
It is hardly necessary to add that the amalgamation of the pres-
ent dual facilities where they exist would be mandatory in order to
facilitate the suggested changes. With adoption across religious lines
being permitted and encouraged, separate Children's Aid Societies
would serve no useful purpose. This too, would result in considerable
4 2 Quaere: would the phraseology "religious or spiritual" belief dn the
suggested revision of the statute be judged by the courts to permit adoption
by those "without religious or spiritual belief", that is, agnostics and atheists?4 3 
"Where practicable" is to be construed in the revised section 31 in its
liberal context. Some courts in the United States have, it is submitted,
tortured "where practicable" beyond the intended meaning of the legislators.
Consequently a Protestant boy with a cleft-palate and subnormal intelligence
would be held not adoptable by a Jewish couple on the theory that "wherepracticable" meant that someone Protestant, somewhere, would wish to adopt
the boy, but had not yet applied.
44 R.S.O. 1960, c. 53, sec. 62 provides that there is a mandatory six months
probationary period in all adoption proceedings before the order is made final.
The existence of this waiting period was a factor in choosing the age of four
years as a line of demarcation.4 5 Also in the nature of procedure, to prevent a possible misuse of the
facilities providing for temporary wardship under section 17(15) of the Child
Welfare Act it might be necessary, to prevent mothers of illegitimate children,
with strong religious convictions from withholding their consents until the
child is two years of age and hence not as easily placed for adoption. To
prevent this deprivation of welfare to the child it is recommended that this
maximum period of temporary wardship be reduced to twelve months,, but
only in the case of mothers of illegitimate children.
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economies, but of course these would be of little consequence when
compared with the economies gained through the reduction in pay-
ments to foster homes.
In closing, allusion should be made to another important benefit
to be derived from the proposed changes; there should be a substan-
tial decrease in the number of private adoptions. It has been said,
"While the majority of these private placements are successful', they
are usually not recommended. A comparison of agency and private
adoptions in California recently showed that the agency placement
is twenty times more likely to turn out happily. Adoption procedure
as carried out in good agencies is a complicated and skilled business-
a partnership of social work, pediatrics, psychiatry, psychology, law,
anthropology and genetics. The identity of the adopting parent is kept
secret from the mother, and finally, great care is taken to match the
child and the adopting parents. These careful procedures are not often
found in private placement with somewhat tragic results".46 It may
be inferred from this that even honestly-contrived private adoptions
cannot compare with those passing through the Children's Aid
Societies. Society would thus benefit from the shifting of many place-
ments from the former to the latter category, a likely result of the
proposed amendments.
More importantly, the proposed amendments would remove much
of the incentive and marked demand which currently supports a flour-
ishing black market effected through private adoptions, a business
reputedly worth over a million dollars a year in Ontario. For it is the
couple, discouraged by the agencies today, due to the scarcity of
babies available of their "faith" who is forced to deal in the black
market. There is a necessary corollary resulting from the removal
from the black market of couples who, except for their religion,
would be approved by the agencies under the present legislation;
that is a recommendation for stiffer enforcement of the black market
penalty provision, section 80 of the Child Welfare Act. For, after the
suggested amendments were implemented, any couple still forced to
have recourse to such clandestine means to obtain a child would not
be a couple capable of caring for the welfare of a child and should be
severely dealt with.
What is needed is an increased awareness of the multiplicity of
problems impeding adoption practices in Ontario. Perhaps the public
opinion can create a demand for legislation to enforce a separation of
church and state in this area. Only then, will true child welfare be
achieved.
46 Katz, Sidney, Why can't you adopt a child?, October 1957, Chatelaine
at p. 118.
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